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TOUCHING AND CONCERNING COPYRIGHT:
REAL PROPERTY REASONING IN MDY

INDUSTRIES, INC. V. BLIZZARD
ENTERTAINMENT, INC.
Molly Shaffer Van Houweling*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Copyright and patent law establish exclusive rights that
attach to intangible works of authorship and invention.
These rights are often entangled with separate property
rights attached to tangible copies of those intangible works.
For example, an author may own the copyright to a novel she
has written while a reader owns a particular book embodying
that novel.' Because of the author's copyright, there are
* Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley. Thanks to Eric
Goldman, Jason Schultz, Brian Carver, and the other participants in the Santa
Clara High Tech Law Institute's conference on "Exhaustion and First Sale in
Intellectual Property," for which this article was prepared. Thanks also to
Jennifer Rothman and other participants in the Loyola Law School, Los
Angeles, IP Theory Colloquium; to Jeanne Fromer, Sonia Katyal, and other
participants in the Fordham Law School IP & Innovation Colloquium; and to
Cynthia Ho, Edward Lee, and other participants in the Chicago Intellectual
Property Colloquium co-sponsored by Chicago-Kent College of Law and Loyola
University Chicago School of Law.
Anyone may make verbatim copies of this article, so long as the
following notice is retained on all publicly distributed copies:
@ 2011 Molly Shaffer Van Houweling. Originally published in the
Santa Clara Law Review. This work is licensed under the Creative
Commons Attribution-NoDerivs 3.0 United States License. To view a
copy of this license, visit httpI/creativecommons.org/icenses/bynd/3.0/us/ or send a letter to Creative Commons, 171 Second Street,
Suite 300, San Francisco, California, 94105, USA.
1. Section 202 of the Copyright Act makes this distinction clear:
Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights under a
copyright, is distinct from ownership of any material object in which
the work is embodied. Transfer of ownership of any material object, including the copy or phonorecord in which the work is first fixed, does
not of itself convey any rights in the copyrighted work embodied in the
object; nor, in the absence of an agreement, does transfer of ownership
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certain things the reader may not do with the book,
notwithstanding her ownership of it. For example, she may
not-subject to certain exceptions-read aloud from it on a
public stage to a paying audience.' This and other limitations
on the reader's use of her own personal property are not the
result of any special relationship she has with the author.
Instead, these limitations adhere in the nature of the author's
intellectual property right, which runs with the intangible
work of authorship (and, as a practical matter, with its
tangible embodiment) to bind anyone who encounters itincluding our initial reader and any subsequent possessors of
her book.
These complicated intersections between intangible and
tangible property rights are mediated by intellectual property
"exhaustion." This concept provides (through various specific
doctrinal mechanisms in copyright, patent, and trademark
law3 ) that at least some of an intellectual property owner's
rights no longer apply-they are "exhausted"-upon the
lawful transfer of an authorized embodiment of the protected
intangible subject matter. Although the exhaustion concept
is fuzzy around the edges and frustratingly under-theorized,
one function it clearly serves is to limit the extent to which
the intangible rights held by intellectual property owners can
interfere with the freedom of owners of tangible objects to
exercise rights normally incident to personal property
ownership-to use those objects "in the ordinary pursuits of
life," as the Supreme Court has put it.4 In this way,
of a copyright or of any exclusive rights under a copyright convey property rights in any material object.
17 U.S.C. § 202 (2006).
2. This would amount to performing the work publicly, see 17 U.S.C. § 101
(defining "to perform . . . a work 'publicly'" as, inter alia, "to perform ...

it at a

place open to the public or at any place where a substantial number of persons
outside of a normal circle of family and its social acquaintances is gathered").
Public performance is an exclusive right of a copyright owner granted by 17
U.S.C. § 106(4). The paying audience would take this performance out of one
exception for noncommercial performances, 17 U.S.C. § 110(4)(A), but it might
qualify for other exceptions, see e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 110(4)(B), including fair use, 17
U.S.C. § 107.
3. My focus here will be on patent and, especially, copyright law. My
analysis of exhaustion in these two contexts is shaped by the constitutional text
that authorizes these bodies of law. Because trademark law does not share the
same constitutional origin, my analysis does necessarily apply there.
4. Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539, 549 (1852); see also Quanta
Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs. Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 625 (2008) (quoting Bloomer, 55
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exhaustion operates much like doctrines that have long
limited the ways in which non-possessory interests in real
property (so-called "servitudes") can interfere with the rights
Like those limiting
of landowners to use their land.
doctrines, exhaustion's limits have been subject to pressure
applied by property owners eager to have the force of law
behind the novel restrictions they would impose on others.
In previous work I have described some of the limiting
doctrines from the law of real servitudes, and have examined
whether their rationales might also be relevant to
contemporary questions about intellectual property.' In this
article I begin to examine, in more detail, one particular
doctrinal restriction from the land servitude context-the
"touch and concern" requirement. Touch and concern has
long been maligned as anachronistic, indeterminate, and
Some courts, and the recent Restatement
unnecessary.
(Third) of Servitudes, have abandoned the requirement
altogether in the land servitude context.7 Ironically, the
spirit-if not the exact terminology-of touch and concern
may be reemerging as courts grapple with a new generation
of servitude-like restrictions imposed by intellectual property
owners.
The glimmer of this reasoning appears in MDY
Industries, Inc. v. Blizzard Entertainment, Inc.,' where the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit struggled to apply a
specific statutory manifestation of exhaustion in the
MDY suggests that the reasoning
copyright context.
underlying the touch and concern doctrine may be more
useful in this new context than in the land context where it
first arose.

U.S. 539).
5. Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 GEO. L.J. 885
(2008).
6. See infra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
8. MDY Indus. v. Blizzard Entm't, 629 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2010), as
amended on denial of rehearing, 2011 WL 538748 (2011). I am not the only
observer to see this glimmer. See, e.g., E-mail from Professor Greg Lastowka to
CyberProf Listserv, Ninth Circuit Opinion in MDY v. Blizzard (Dec. 17, 2010)
(on file with author).
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II. LAND SERVITUDES, CHATTEL SERVITUDES, AND THE NEW
SERVITUDES 9

A land servitude is a non-possessory property interest
that gives its holder the right to use land in specified ways, to
object to particular uses of it, or to insist on certain behavior
connected to it.'0 Servitudes are voluntarily created by
property owners, typically in writing (but sometimes by
estoppel, implication, or prescription) and with some
manifestation of intent to create an encumbrance that "run[s]
with" the land, "pass[ing] automatically to successive owners
or occupiers."" Unlike a mere contractual agreement to, say,
refrain from blocking your neighbor's satellite dish, a
servitude is enforceable against successors in interest.
Therefore, if you grant your neighbor an effective servitude,
she will be able to enforce the restriction against you and any
subsequent owners of your land. The benefit of a servitude
typically runs to successors as well-from your neighbor to
the next owner of her house.12
The land-use planning needs of the Industrial Revolution
triggered the development of modern Anglo-American land
servitude law. "3 Increased urban density and the potential
9. This section relies heavily on my previous work on servitudes. See Van
Houweling, supra note 5.
10. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 1.1 (2000);
Susan F. French, Design Proposal for the New Restatement of Property
Servitudes, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1213, 1214-15 (1988) [hereinafter French,
Design Proposal] (explaining how various types of servitudes-including
"easements, profits, covenants, and equitable servitudes"-"create interests
running with the land. They create nonpossessory rights in the land of another,
which pass with ownership or occupancy of the benefited land or estate, and
corresponding duties, which pass with ownership or occupancy of the burdened
land or estate."); see also Susan F. French, Toward a Modern Law of Servitudes:
Reweaving the Ancient Strands, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1261 (1982) [hereinafter
French, Strands];Van Houweling, supra note 5, at 891-905.
11. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 1.1.
12. See, e.g., French, Strands, supra note 10, at 1264. On the complicated
and evolving issue of when possessors who are not owners succeed to the
benefits and burdens of servitudes, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:
SERVITUDES, ch. 5, introductory note; GERALD KORNGOLD, PRIVATE LAND USE
ARRANGEMENTS: EASEMENTS, REAL COVENANTS AND EQUITABLE SERVITUDES §§
5.03, 9.14(b)-(c) (2d ed. 2004).
13. Easements existed in Roman law and running covenants were
recognized as early as Spencer's Case, (1583) 77 Eng. Rep. 72 (K.B.), in 1583.
But "(uintil the Industrial Revolution greatly increased the use of servitudes,
the common law did not develop a general theory of easements or servitudes."
French, Design Proposal, supra note 10, at 1214; see also Uriel Reichman,
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for conflicts between neighboring property owners prompted a
variety of attempts to coordinate land uses through durable
private arrangements. 4 Nineteenth-century English courts
They
reacted to this development with ambivalence.
recognized affirmative easements-rights of way and other
non-possessory rights to use burdened land.' 5 And under
very limited circumstances they enforced running duties to
use land in specified ways as negative easements or as "real
covenants."'"
But the courts resisted most attempts to
enforce running use restrictions against successors until the
landmark 1848 case of Tulk v. Moxhay." In Tulk, the Court
of Chancery established the notion of an "equitable
servitude"-a land-use restriction that binds successors to the
burdened land who take the land with notice of the
restriction.18

Although Tulk liberalized the English law of servitudes
somewhat, even courts of equity following Tulk imposed a
thicket of doctrinal limitations on attempts to impose running
use restrictions.' 9
Many of these doctrinal restrictions
imposed by English courts were imported into early U.S.
decisions.
Over time, however, the law in the United States has
become more accommodating toward real servitudes. Courts
(in addition to commentators and some state legislatures)
seem convinced by the argument that land servitudes can
promote efficient land use and can be fair to successors in
interest, so long as everyone burdened has the opportunity for
clear notice-an opportunity that modern recording systems
generally provide."
Toward a Unified Concept of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1179, 1183 (1982).
14. See, e.g., A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE LAND LAW 262 (2d ed.
1986); French, Strands, supra note 10, at 1262; James L. Winokur, The Mixed
Blessings of Promissory Servitudes: Toward Optimizing Economic Utility,
Individual Liberty, and PersonalIdentity, 1989 WIs. L. REV. 1, 13 (1989).
15. See generally Winokur, supra note 14, at 12.
16. See generally id. at 12 & n.43.
17. (1848) 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Ch.).
18. As Lord Cottenham explained in Tulk, "the question is

. . .

whether a

party shall be permitted to use the land in a manner inconsistent with the
contract entered into by his vendor, and with notice of which he purchased." Id.
at 1144.
19. See generally SIMPSON, supra note 14, at 256-60 (describing
development of English case law before and after Tulk).
20. See generally French, Design Proposal, supra note 10, at 1223
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While courts have increasingly accommodated land
servitudes, the conventional wisdom under Anglo-American
law has long been that the types of servitudes that can be
attached to land cannot be attached to chattels.2 1 Several
rationales have been offered for this prohibition, including the
difficulty of ensuring adequate notice of chattel servitudes in
the absence of the recording systems that provide notice in
the land context.22 In the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, U.S. courts grappled with the tension between this
general rule of the common law and the non-possessory
statutory rights that copyright and patent law create.
The issue is a complicated one. In the limited way noted
above, 24 every copyright and patent creates the type of nonpossessory right to control the use of chattels that common
law has traditionally refused to recognize.2 5 Technically, the
("Servitudes law may be simplified substantially because particular rules
designed to give notice are no longer needed. The modem technology of record
systems and title search procedures, together with the protection recording acts
afford, have made these rules superfluous.").
21. See, e.g., John D. Park & Sons v. Hartman, 153 F. 24 (6th Cir. 1907)
It is .

.

. a general rule of the common law that a contract restricting

the use or controlling subsales cannot be annexed to a chattel so as to
follow the article and obligate the subpurchaser by operation of notice.
A covenant which may be valid and run with land will not run with or
attach to a mere chattel.
Id. at 39; see generally Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Music Goes Round and
Round: Equitable Servitudes and Chattels, 69 HARv. L. REV. 1250 (1956);
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Equitable Servitudes on Chattels, 41 HARV. L. REV. 945
(1928); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and
Verification: The Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J.
LEGAL STUD. 373, 407 (2002); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal
Standardizationin the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110
YALE L.J. 1, 18 (2000); Van Houweling, supra note 5, at 906-25 (2008). But cf.
Glen 0. Robinson, PersonalPropertyServitudes, 71 U. Ciii. L. REV. 1449 (2004).
22. See, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 21, at 407, arguing that:
Part of the reason [that it is so "much simpler to establish partial
rights in real property than in personal property"] is that the registries
developed for verifying ownership of land are available to record these
other [partial] interests as well, hence avoiding many of the additional
system and nonuser costs that effective verification of these rights
would otherwise require.
Id.; see generally Van Houweling, supra note 5, at 906-25.
23. See generally Van Houweling, supra note 5, at 910-24 (discussing cases).
24. See supra Part I.
25. See generally Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 21, at 407 (observing
that "[clopyright law . . . permits the creation of divided property rights in the
sense that it allows the right to copy a book (or other publication) to be
separated from the right to possess a physical copy").
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subject matter of these intellectual property regimes extends
only to intangible works of authorship and invention, not to
the tangible objects embodying those works. But because of
that embodiment, the regimes necessarily impose some
constraints on use of the physical objects as well. The concept
of intellectual property "exhaustion" can be understood as an
attempt to minimize the extent to which those constraints
cover "ordinary" uses of copies of copyrighted works and of
physical objects that embody patented inventions.2 6
When the lawful owner of a patented phonograph
machine uses it to play records, for example, he does not
thereby infringe the patent-notwithstanding the Patent
Act's prohibition on unauthorized "use" of patented
Courts have explained that the initial
inventions.2 7
authorized sale of a patent-embodying item "terminates" or
"exhausts" the patent holder's rights. This doctrine has come
to be known as patent exhaustion.28 In copyright, many
ordinary uses of copies of copyrighted works simply do not
implicate an exclusive right of the copyright holder at all, as
there is no exclusive right to "use" in the Copyright Act.29
Using a physical book by reading it, for example, does not
require authorization. Showing or selling (or giving, or
lending, etc.) the book to someone else is also not generally
covered by copyright-notwithstanding the copyright owner's
exclusive rights to display and distribute copies to the
public 3 0-because of limiting doctrines in copyright that are
analogous to patent exhaustion.
Similar to patent exhaustion, these copyright doctrines
were initially articulated by courts. 31 But they were also
26. E.g., Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539, 549 (1852) ("[Tlhe purchaser of
the implement or machine for the purpose of using it in the ordinary pursuits of
life, stands on different ground . . . . [W]hen the machine passes to the hands of
the purchaser, it is no longer within the limits of the monopoly.").
27. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006).
28. E.g., Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 625 (2008)
("The longstanding doctrine of patent exhaustion provides that the initial
authorized sale of a patented item terminates all patent rights to that item.").
29. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
30. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(3) & 106(5) (establishing the copyright owner's
exclusive right "to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to
the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending"
and "to display the copyrighted work publicly").
31. See generally Aaron K. Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Digital
Exhaustion, 58 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming Apr. 2011) (draft manuscript
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codified, at least in part, in the Copyright Act of 1909,32 which
introduced a statutory provision commonly referred to as the
"first sale doctrine." The codified first sale doctrine currently
resides in § 109 of the Copyright Act, where it limits
copyright holders' rights to control the display and
distribution of lawfully made copies of their works by owners
of those copies.33 More recently, Congress added a separate
provision in § 117 that limits copyright holders' reproduction
rights in a way that privileges ordinary uses of copies of
computer software. 34 This limit, known as the "essential
step" exception, allows an owner of a copy of a computer
program to reproduce that copy to the extent necessary to use
the program on her computer."
Despite these legislative recognitions of the exhaustion
concept in the copyright context, and the Supreme Court's
recent reiteration of the importance of patent exhaustion in
Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics,3 6 these doctrines
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1669562).
32. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 41, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075
(1909). The provision is now 17 U.S.C. § 109, which specifies in relevant part
that:
the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this
title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the
authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord .

.

. [and that] .

.

. the owner of a

particular copy lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright
owner, to display that copy publicly, either directly or by the projection
of no more than one image at a time, to viewers present at the place
where the copy is located.
Id.
As Perzanowski and Schultz explain, the codified first sale doctrine of
current § 109 only incompletely captures the principle of copyright exhaustion
developed in the courts. See Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 31, at 29-45.
33. 17 U.S.C. § 109.
34. See generally Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 31, at 42-45.
35. The relevant language of that provision states that:
it is not an infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer program
to make or authorize the making of another copy or adaptation of that
computer program provided . .. that such a new copy or adaptation is
created as an essential step in the utilization of the computer program
in conjunction with a machine and that it is used in no other manner. .
17 U.S.C. § 117(a).
36. 553 U.S. 617 (2008). The Court also had a recent opportunity to address
first sale under the Copyright Act, but an equally divided Court affirmed the
decision of the lower court without issuing an opinion. Costco Wholesale Corp.
v. Omega, S.A., 131 S. Ct. 565 (2010).
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have over the past several decades begun more and more to
resemble the law of land servitudes.
Non-possessory
restrictions that once met judicial hostility have been
accommodated, at least in cases where the burdened party
acquired the intellectual property-embodying chattel with
notice of the restrictions."
There are reasons to doubt
whether enforcement of these "new servitudes" is generally
desirable.3 8 But for now I want to focus on another question:
assuming it is possible for intellectual property owners to
impose-with notice-use restrictions on copies of their
works, what substantive limitations should there be on the
terms of those restrictions? In the land context, this question
has traditionally been addressed with the "touch and concern"
requirement.39
III. THE TOUCH AND CONCERN REQUIREMENT IN THE LAW OF
LAND SERVITUDES 40

Among the servitude-limiting doctrines imposed by
English courts and initially adopted by U.S. courts was the
requirement that running duties or restrictions (whether
recognized as real covenants or equitable servitudes)" "touch
and concern" both the burdened and benefitted land.4 2 What
37. See, e.g., Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010);
Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992); United
States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180 (9th Cir. 1977).
38. See Van Houweling, supra note 5; see also, e.g., Brian W. Carver, Why
License Agreements Do Not Control Copy Ownership:First Sales and Essential
Copies, BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2011); Perzanowski & Schultz, supra
note 31; John A. Rothchild, The Incredible Shrinking First-Sale Rule: Are
Software Resale Limits Lawful?, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (2004).
39. See infra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
40. This section relies heavily on my previous work on servitudes. See Van
Houweling, supra note 5.
41. See generally KORNGOLD, supra note 12, at 348 ("Under the prevailing
rule, the courts hold that a covenant must touch and concern the land in order
for it to run. This is a requirement in actions both at law and in equity.");
French, Strands,supra note 10, at 1277.
42. As Restatement Reporter Susan French helpfully summarizes,
"[tiraditional servitudes doctrine requires that covenant burdens and benefits
touch and concern the land if they are to pass automatically to successors of the
original covenanting parties. The doctrine ... applies regardless of the parties'
intent, limiting the kinds of covenants that can be made into servitudes." Susan
F. French, The Touch and Concern Doctrine and the Restatement (Third) of
Servitudes: A Tribute to Lawrence E. Berger, 77 NEB. L. REV. 653, 653 (1998)
(citing Spencer's Case, (1583) 77 Eng. Rep. 72 (K.B.)); see generally KORNGOLD,
supra note 12, at 349 ("The authorities mostly agree that touch and concern
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the burdened party is required to do (or to refrain from doing)
must be connected to her land and also to the land of the
party enforcing the servitude.43 Imagine that a landowner
sells half of her land subject to a purported real covenant
binding the buyer and her successors in interest to sing
"Happy Birthday" annually for the benefit of the owner of the
retained parcel. The touch and concern doctrine could be
applied to render such a non-land-use-related servitude
unenforceable against successors.
The touch and concern requirement has been defended on
several grounds.4 4 One justification for the doctrine is that it
promotes notice, because restrictions and duties tied to land
use are relatively easy to discover upon physical inspection.4 5
Another justification is that non-land-use-related restrictions
and duties are likely to satisfy merely the idiosyncratic
whims of the original parties-and therefore to become
obsolete with the passage of time. As Uriel Reichman argues,
"obligations not related to actual property use are highly
individualized. They tend, therefore, to become inefficient in
the short run following a transfer."4 6 Relatedly, Reichman
objects to limiting the autonomy of future generations
without the type of land-use justification that the doctrine
requires. As he argues,

means that in order for a covenant to run, there must be some fundamental link
between the promise and the burdened and benefited land. The question of
touch and concern must be analyzed on both sides of the covenant.").
43. One widely-cited articulation of the test is whether the servitude
"operate[s] to make more valuable some of the rights, privileges, or powers
possessed by the covenantee or to relieve him in whole or in part of some of his
duties." Harry A. Bigelow, The Content of Covenants in Leases, 12 MICH. L.
REV. 639 (1914). A variation provides that
[ilf the promisor's legal relations in respect to the land in question are
lessened-his legal interest as an owner rendered less valuable by the
promise-the burden of the covenant touches or concerns that land; if
the promisee's legal relations in respect to that land are increased-his
legal interest as owner rendered more valuable by the promise-the
benefit of the covenant touches and concerns the land.
CHARLES E. CLARK, REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH "RUN WITH
LAND" 97 (2d ed. 1947).
44. See generally KORNGOLD, supra note 12, at 352-53 (summarizing
commentary critiquing and defending the doctrine).
45. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 21, at 402 (noting that
servitudes touching and concerning the land "are much easier to verify upon
physical inspection of property").
46. Reichman, supra note 13, at 1233.
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[p]rivate property is sanctioned by society not only to
promote efficiency, but also to safeguard individual
freedom. Servitudes are a kind of private legislation
affecting a line of future owners.
Limiting such
"legislative powers" to an objective purpose of land
planning eliminates the possibility of creating modern
variations of feudal serfdom.4 7
Although Reichman is not its only defender,4 8 the touch
and concern doctrine has more often been scorned by
commentators and evaded by courts. One objection is that its
purported purposes are better served by other mechanisms.
Notice can be provided through land recording systems, for
And substantively obsolete or unreasonable
example.49
servitudes can be judicially modified or terminated ex post as
needed.o
As for Reichman's argument that limiting the autonomy
of future generations is not justifiable without an "objective
purpose of land planning," this rationale for the touch and
concern doctrine is vulnerable in the absence of some agreedupon set of land planning purposes. If a landowner gets
special enjoyment (and attaches additional value to her land)
because she is secure in the knowledge that her neighbors
and their successors will forever be required to sing "Happy
Birthday" to her and to her successors, then imposing that
requirement arguably is a "land planning" purpose-unless
we have some theory of "land planning" that rejects such
whims. In his critique of touch and concern, Richard Epstein
argues that the purposes of land ownership cannot be cabined
in that way:

47. Id.
48. See, e.g., Jeffrey E. Stake, Toward an Economic Understandingof Touch
and Concern, 1988 DUKE L.J. 925 (1988); A. Dan Tarlock, Touch and Concern is
Dead, Long Live the Doctrine, 77 NEB. L. REV. 804, 809 (1998). Cf Stewart E.
Sterk, Freedom from Freedom of Contract: The Enduring Value of Servitude
Restrictions, 70 IOWA L. REV. 615, 646-49 (1985) (noting useful purposes served
by the doctrine but conceding that its ambiguity produces uncertainty costs).
49. See generally French,supra note 42, at 654.
50. See, e.g., KORNGOLD, supra note 12, at 353, arguing that:
t]he current touch and concern test . . . may not be the best way to control
inefficient and eccentric covenants in all cases ...

[and that] .

.

. courts should

straightforwardly face the issues inherent in difficult covenants ... and resolve
them in terms of articulated policies as well as the values of freedom of contract,
and the policy against land restrictions.
Id.; French, Strands, supra note 10, at 1308; French, supra note 42, at 654.
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Insistence that the attachment of merely personal
obligations to land is likely to frustrate, rather than
enhance, the objectives which a private land holding
system seeks to realize presupposes that we have some
collective vision of what that system is supposed to do.
Yet one traditional argument for both freedom of contract
and private property is that they define domains in which
individuals may establish both the means and the ends for
themselves, to pursue as they see fit (so long as they do
not infringe upon the rights of third parties). Private
property is an institution that fosters individualized, if not
eccentric, preferences; it does not stamp them out. We
may not understand why property owners want certain
obligations to run with the land, but as it is their land, not
ours, some very strong reason should be advanced before
our intentions are allowed to control.5
Epstein's rejection of any "collection vision" for property may
represent an extreme view. But he is not alone in criticizing
the touch and concern doctrine for failing to provide a
satisfactory theory of the purposes that servitude restrictions
may validly serve.5 2
In sum, the touch and concern doctrine has been justified
in terms of limiting notice and information costs, preempting
servitude obsolescence, and keeping enforcement of nonpossessory property rights consistent with the purposes of
private land ownership. But it has been criticized on the
grounds that insufficient notice and obsolescence are
addressed by superior alternative mechanisms, and that
using the purposes of land ownership as a touchstone will
either be hopelessly indeterminate or else will impose
limitations that reflect an unjustifiably cramped notion of the
ends of property ownership. In light of these and other
criticisms, some U.S. courts have relaxed the touch and
The recent Restatement (Third) of
concern requirement.
and
concern
touch
abandons
Property: Servitudes

51. Richard A. Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of
Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1353, 1359 (1982).
52. Even Jeffrey Stake, a defender of touch and concern, acknowledges that
the foremost articulation of the touch and concern doctrine "runs in a circle."
Stake, supra note 48, at 929.
53. See RIcHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 60.04 (2005);
Sterk, supra note 48 at 649 n.141 (noting the paucity of case law invalidating
servitudes for failure to satisfy the touch and concern requirement).
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altogether.54
IV. REVIVING TOUCH AND CONCERN TO CONTROL THE NEW
SERVITUDES
Contemporary attempts to impose novel running
restrictions on the use of intangible works of authorship and
invention-and thus on the tangible objects embodying those
works-can be analyzed as servitudes.66 Some observers use
the servitude characterization to call these restrictions into
question." To others, judicial enforcement of servitude-like
restrictions on users of intellectual creations and their
embodiments is consistent with the liberalizing attitude
toward land servitudes and rightly represents the
preeminence of freedom of contract over hostility towards
restraints on resource use and transfer.
The judicial reception has been mixed, but at least some
courts have allowed both patent and copyright owners to
impose (and to enforce through infringement lawsuits)
running restrictions on users of copies of their intellectual
works. 8 The primary mechanism by which this move has
been accomplished, notwithstanding the exhaustion doctrines
described above, is the characterization of a user's
relationship to the embodiment of a work as a mere "license"
to use it." The scope of this "license" is then determined by
54. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES §§ 2.4, 2.6, 3.2, and
introductory notes to chs. 2 & 3 (2000).
55. See Van Houweling, supra note 5; see also Niva Elkin-Koren, What
Contracts Cannot Do: The Limits of Private Ordering in Facilitatinga Creative
Commons, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 407-08 (2005); William W. Fisher III,
Property and Contracton the Internet, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1203, 1211 (1998);
Wendy J. Gordon, Intellectual Property as Price Discrimination,73 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 1367, nn.1-2 and accompanying text (1998); Thomas M.S. Hemnes,
Restraints on Alienation, Equitable Servitudes and the Feudal Nature of
Computer Software Licensing, 71 DENV. U. L. REV. 577 (1994); Mark A. Lemley,
Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing, 87
CAL. L. REV. 111, 121, 148 (1999); Michael J. Madison, Reconstructing the
Software License, 35 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 275, 306 (2003); Margaret Jane Radin,
Humans, Computers, and Binding Commitment, 75 IND. L.J. 1125, 1138-39
(1999); Robinson, supra note 21, at 1478; Rothchild, supra note 38, at 45.
56. E.g., Elkin-Koren, supra note 55; Radin, supra note 55.
57. Robinson, supra note 21.
58. E.g., Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010);
Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992); United
States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180 (9th Cir. 1977).
59. See generally Carver,supra note 38; Rothchild, supra note 38.
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consulting an "End User License Agreement" (EULA) or
"Terms of Use" (ToU) provided by the copyright or patent
owner. 60
As a practical matter, this accomplishes the same result
as those cases that liberalized the law of land servitudes:
allowing original parties to transfer possession of an object
and to characterize that transaction in a way that imposes
property-based restrictions running to subsequent possessors
of the object, whether or not there is any contractual
relationship between the ultimately benefited and burdened
parties. But recognizing the possibility of running use
restrictions-the intellectual property equivalent of Tulk v.
Moxhay-does not resolve the question of what (if any)
substantive limitations there should be upon those
restrictions. Should there be, in other words, a touch and
concern doctrine for intellectual property servitudes?
On first utterance, the notion seems laughable. Why
address digital-age intellectual property puzzles by reviving a
land law doctrine that has, even in its native doctrinal
as
"anachronistic "61
characterized
been
context,
"superseded," "a confusing artifact of history,"6 2 a "hoary
requirement . . . relegated to the dustbin," 3 and "a feudal

relic best abandoned"?" Indeed, to my knowledge, no court
has in fact expressly invoked the much-maligned "touch and
concern" doctrine in this intellectual property context. But,
as at least one other observer has noted,6 6 the Ninth Circuit's
recent decision in MDY Industries, Inc. v. Blizzard
Entertainment, Inc." employs an analysis of a running
60. See generally Rothchild, supra note 38.
61. Winokur, supra note 14, at 143.
62. Robinson, supra note 21, observing that:
[tihe latest Restatement of Property, reflecting a growing body of
scholarly opinion that believes the touch and concern doctrine is just a
confusing artifact of history, concludes that it is "superseded," leaving
only specific limitations on certain restraints, such as those that impose unreasonable restraints on alienation or violate some other public
policy.
Id. at 1461 n.36.
63. Stewart E. Sterk, Minority Protection in Residential Private
Governments, 77 B.U. L. REV. 273, 278 (1997).
64. Tarlock, supra note 48, at 809 (defending the doctrine to some extent,
but observing that "[tlo many, the touch and concern doctrine is a feudal relic
best abandoned").
65. See Lastowka, supra note 8.
66. 629 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2010), as amended on denial of rehearing, 2011
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restriction on a copy of a copyrighted work that echoes-and
perhaps improves upon-touch and concern.
V. MDY v. BLIZZARD'S "NEXUS" WITH TOUCH AND CONCERN
In MDY, the Ninth Circuit addressed a dispute between
Blizzard Entertainment and Michael Donnelly regarding
Blizzard's popular online game "World of Warcraft."'
Donnelly initiated the lawsuit, asking the district court to
declare that he did not infringe copyright-or any other right
Blizzard possessed in the game-when he sold his own
software, a program called "Glider," to World of Warcraft
players." Glider is a "bot" program that automatically plays
the World of Warcraft game for a user, so that she can
proceed to advanced levels of the game, even while away from
her computer.6 9 As Donnelly's website explained, "[ylou can
do something else, like eat dinner or go to a movie, and when
you return, you'll have a lot more experience and loot." 0
Blizzard countersued on various theories and the district
court held Donnelly liable for secondary copyright
infringement, for a violation of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA), and for tortious interference with
contract.
My focus here is on the secondary copyright
infringement claim, on which the Ninth Circuit held for
Donnelly.72 I leave for another day the intriguing contrast
with the court's DMCA analysis in favor of Blizzard.
The court's copyright analysis turned in part on the
"essential step" provision in § 117(a)(1) of the Copyright Act.
The provision, described briefly above, declares that
it is not an infringement for the owner of a copy of a
computer program to make or authorize the making of
another copy or adaptation of that computer program
provided ... that such a new copy or adaptation is created
as an essential step in the utilization of the computer

WL 538748 (2011).
67. Id. at 934-35.
68. Id. at 935.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 936-37 (providing procedural history).
72. MDY Indus. v. Blizzard Entm't, 629 F.3d 928, 941-42 (9th Cir. 2010), as
amended on denial of rehearing,2011 WL 538748 (2011).
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program in conjunction with a machine and that it is used
in no other manner. 73
As with other manifestations of the exhaustion concept, this
provision limits the extent that copyright holders may deploy
their non-possessory rights to limit ordinary uses of their
works by owners of lawfully made copies. 74 And also as with
other types of exhaustion, some courts have allowed copyright
owners to forbid even "essential step" copies by characterizing
transactions by which users acquire their initial copies as
"licenses," as opposed to "sales."7 5
The applicability of the essential step provision was
important in MDY because the kernel of Blizzard's copyright
infringement argument was that the users were directly
infringing its copyrights (and that Donnelly was secondarily
liable for helping those users) when they played World of
Warcraft using Glider. 6 The only aspect of the players' use
that implicated Blizzard's exclusive rights under copyright
was the copying of World of Warcraft into the temporary
memory of their computers for purposes of playing the
game-just the type of behavior that the essential step
provision seems to privilege.
Indeed, Donnelly argued that the players' use of the
World of Warcraft software fell within the essential step
exception and was therefore not infringing.77 But users
would not be shielded by the essential step exception if they
were not "owner[s]" of copies as the term is used in § 117.7
On this question, the Ninth Circuit sided with Blizzard.
Copies of the game software were distributed with an End
User License Agreement that the court interpreted, together
with the Terms of Use for the World of Warcraft online
service, as imposing so many restrictions on transfer and use
that the users should be considered as mere "licensees" rather
than owners.7 9 To reach this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit
73. 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1) (2006).
74. On possession and ownership of copies, see generally Joseph P. Liu,
Owning Digital Copies: Copyright Law and the Incidents of Copy Ownership, 42
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1245, 1248-49 (2001).
75. See, e.g., Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. Cnty. Sherriffs Dep't, 447 F.3d 769,
784-85 (9th Cir. 2006).
76. See MDY, 629 F.3d at 937-38.
77. Id. at 938.
78. 17 U.S.C. § 117(a).
79. MDY Indus. v. Blizzard Entm't, 629 F.3d 928, 938-39 (9th Cir. 2010), as
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followed its own controversial logic from Vernor v. Autodesk ,
in effect allowing the copyright holder to impose, via EULAs
and ToUs, servitudes that restrain the otherwise permissible,
"ordinary" behavior of users in lawful possession of copies of
copyrighted works.
I leave to another day the important question of whether
Vernor was correctly decided and applied in MDY (while
noting that this question is made even more interesting by
the same court's recent application of Vernor to reach the
opposite result in UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto81 ). What
is key, for purposes of this article, is that the Ninth Circuit
simultaneously recognized the possibility of this type of
servitude and imposed substantive limits on its terms. In the
land context, this type of substantive scrutiny of the terms of
servitudes has typically been conducted through the doctrinal
lens of the maligned "touch and concern" requirement. The
Ninth Circuit breathes new life into that moribund concept
with its analysis in MDY.
In the land servitude context, courts that apply the touch
and concern doctrine are fundamentally determining whether
a restriction should be treated as a property right or (because
it fails to "touch and concern" and is therefore not a valid
servitude) as a mere contract (with the limitations on privity
and remedies that come with that label). In MDY, the Ninth
Circuit drew an analogous distinction between property
(copyright) and contract, using a touch-and-concern-like
approach to determine whether the restrictions at issue could
be enforced as property rights.
Specifically, once the court had determined that the users
did not qualify for the essential step exception, it was left
with Blizzard's argument that the temporary copies that
users made while playing the game were infringing on
Blizzard's copyright. Although its EULA and ToU gave
paying users permission to play the game (and thus to make
temporary copies of it), Blizzard argued that the permission
was conditioned on compliance with the terms set forth in the
EULA and ToU, including a prohibition on use of "third-party
software designed to modify the World of Warcraft

amended on denial of rehearing,2011 WL 538748 (2011).
80. 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010).
81. 628 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2011).
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experience." 82 Under that argument, no compliance means no
license to use the software-no license (plus no essential step
exception) means that playing the game (which necessarily
involves copying) amounts to infringement by the users and
secondary liability for Donnelly. In other words, Blizzard
demanded a property remedy for violation of the restrictions
it had inserted into its EULA and ToU.
To the Ninth Circuit, there was an alternative possibility:
although the court said the that this type of restriction could
be enforceable as a property right-even against lawful
possessors of copies of the software-it imposed a substantive
screen to determine whether these particular restrictions
should be considered "conditions" that qualify for servitudeThe
like treatment, or as mere contractual "covenants."8
distinction is legally significant because a plaintiff asserting a
breach of covenant is left solely with contractual remedies
against defendants in contractual privity. 84 As the court
explained, "[wie refer to contractual terms that limit a
license's scope as 'conditions,' the breach of which constitute
copyright infringement. We refer to all other license terms as
'covenants,' the breach of which is actionable only under
8
contract law."1
This aspect of the case, thus, came down to the same
fundamental question that courts face when they apply the
touch and concern doctrine to land servitudes: does the
substance of this restriction make it eligible for enforcement
as an in rem property right-binding possessors of the land
beyond the bounds of contractual privity-or must the parties
rely instead on whatever promises they have made between
each other (and on the limited remedial options in breach of
contract actions)?
As with servitudes, the intent of the initial parties to any
restriction is one aspect of determining whether that
restriction should be considered a property interest, as
opposed to a mere contract. And so the Ninth Circuit looked
in part to the way the World of Warcraft EULA and ToU
82. MDY, 629 F.3d at 938.
83. Id. at 939-41.
84. See id. at 941 n.3 (explaining why "a copyright holder may wish to
enforce violations of license agreements as copyright infringements" as opposed
to mere breaches of contract).
85. Id. at 939.
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described the key restrictions at issue. But if this were the
only relevant consideration, a well-drafted license could
characterize any manner of restrictions as conditions of the
license. If a user were to play the game without complying
with those restrictions, the act of playing the game (insofar as
it involved making a copy that is outside of § 117) would
establish a prima facie case of copyright infringement. A
license could say, for example: "permission to reproduce this
software for purposes of playing the game is granted only on
the condition that the player submits three positive reviews
to the GameRate videogame review website." If conditions
were not subject to any substantive scrutiny, then failure to
submit the positive reviews would take the player's copying
outside the scope of the license and therefore into the realm of
The Ninth Circuit describes this
copyright infringement."
possibility:
Blizzard-or any software copyright holder-could
designate any disfavored conduct during software use as
copyright infringement, by purporting to condition the
license on the player's abstention from the disfavored
conduct. The rationale would be that because the conduct
occurs while the player's computer is copying the software
code into RAM in order for it to run, the violation is
copyright infringement.
If we were to borrow Epstein's logic from the land
servitude context, there is nothing wrong with this scenario:
if a copyright owner who can forbid copying altogether
decides instead to condition the permission to copy on
compliance with some idiosyncratic whim, so be it. To see
why the touch and concern requirement may be more useful
in this context than in its native domain, recall that Epstein's
biting critique of limitations on land servitudes turned on the
absence of "some collective vision of what [a private land
holding system] is supposed to do."88 Whatever the validity of
Epstein's claim in the land context," it does not apply to
86. A similar logic would allow a copyright owner to impose running
restraints on the distribution or display of copies, if the copies had managed to
evade the first sale doctrine of 17 U.S.C. § 109 following the logic of, e.g., Vernor
v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010).
87. MDY Indus. v. Blizzard Entm't, 629 F.3d 928, 941 (9th Cir. 2010), as
amended on denial of rehearing,2011 WL 538748 (2011).
88. Epstein, supra note 51, at 1359 and accompanying text.
89. I certainly do not mean to endorse Epstein's view in the land context,
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intellectual property-where the purpose of the exclusive
rights is constitutionally defined as to "promote of Progress of
Science and useful Arts."" If the essence of the touch and
concern inquiry is to probe whether a given restriction affects
the value of burdened and benefitted resources, however
"value" is defined in the given property scheme, then the
inquiry simply makes more sense where value can be defined
with reference to the property scheme's clearly-specified
purpose.
An example from another type of copyright dispute helps
demonstrate the point. In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,
Inc.,91 the Supreme Court's fair use analysis turned in part on
the statutory factor of "the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work."9 2 In his
analysis of that factor, Justice Souter posed the interesting
question whether it should count against a claim of fair use
that the defendant has employed the copyright holder's
expression to ridicule the copyright holder, and therefore to
hurt the marketplace value of his work." Justice Souter
concluded that it should not, explaining that "[wle do not, of
course, suggest that a parody may not harm the market at
all, but when a lethal parody, like a scathing theater review,
kills demand for the original, it does not produce a harm
cognizable under the Copyright Act."9 4 Why not? Surely a
"lethal parody" has an effect on the "value of the copyrighted
work" in the sense that a copyright owner measures "value."
And yet Souter insists that this diminution in value is simply
not cognizable under the Copyright Act. This conclusion
makes perfect sense only if one recognizes that the Copyright
Act protects the value of copyrighted works not to satisfy the
whims of copyright owners, but rather for a specific purpose:
to promote intellectual progress. Souter's logic here reflects
the notion that progress would be undermined, not promoted,
by deploying copyright to protect copyright owners from
critique.

but only to demonstrate its clear inapplicability to intellectual property.
90. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

91. 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
92. Id. at 590.
93. See id. at 591-92.
94. Id.
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Importing this logic into a touch-and-concern-style
analysis might yield a rule such as this: a copyright license
condition that purports to impose a running restriction on use
of a copy of a copyrighted work is enforceable only where its
enforcement would promote the purposes of the copyright
holder's exclusive rights. This proposed rule is not so
different from what the Ninth Circuit appears to have
adopted in MDY.
The Ninth's Circuit's substantive screen for sorting
enforceable conditions from mere covenants is this: "We
conclude that for a licensee's violation of a contract to
constitute copyright infringement, there must be a nexus
between the condition and the licensor's exclusive rights of
copyright.""5 With its focus on the substantive connection
between the restriction and the property right, this appears
similar to the touch and concern requirement. Alas, as with
touch and concern, the nature of the relationship required to
satisfy the test is a bit unclear.
One way to understand the Ninth Circuit's nexus
requirement is that enforceable license conditions are only
those that forbid behavior that would-when viewed in
isolation-violate an exclusive right of the copyright holder if
undertaken without a license. For example, a license might
say, "the licensor may copy the work for non-commercial but
The condition-no nonnot for commercial purposes."
commercial copying-restricts behavior that, but for the
license, would be a copyright infringement." By contrast,
understanding the nexus requirement in this way would
likely exclude my hypothetical license that requires
submission of favorable game reviews as a condition of
playing the game. It is possible to identify the regulated
behavior (submission of favorable game reviews) separately
from the licensed behavior (copying the game for purposes of
playing it). But if this is how to understand "nexus," then it
is unclear why there was not a nexus in MDY, where the
forbidden conduct itself-playing World of Warcraft with
Glider-involved making a copy of Blizzard's copyrighted
game on the user's computer.9 7
95. MDY Indus. v. Blizzard Entm't., 629 F.3d 928, 941 (9th Cir. 2010), as
amended on denial of rehearing,2011 WL 538748 (2011).
96. See, e.g., Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
97. The court does not clarify its nexus requirement when it addresses the
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The analysis and its rationale might be clearer if framed
somewhat differently: whether there is a nexus between the
condition and the purposes served by the exclusive rights of
the copyright holder.
Because copyright-unlike real
property-has a constitutionally identified purpose, this
approach should have more teeth than a purpose-based
version of touch and concern. Subjected to this test, violation
of my hypothetical license that conditions permission to copy
on submission of favorable game reviews could not be
enforced as a copyright infringement because the condition
lacks a nexus with the purposes of copyright and is instead in
tension with those purposes. Any claim by the copyright
owner that the value of its work is harmed by violations of
this condition is no more persuasive than the argument in
Campbell concerning harm caused to an original song by a
biting parody.9 8 The copyright owner may, in fact, be harmed
by such behavior. But copyright law should not care-and
should not make its power and remedies available to prevent
such harm. As for the limitations on bot-enabled play at
issue in MDY itself, the question is a closer one. My
preliminary assessment, based on the facts conveyed in the
MDY opinion, is that use of Glider may degrade the game
experience for other users in a way that has a nexus with the
progress-promoting purposes of the exclusive right to prepare
derivative works. I hope to return to a more detailed
assessment of that question-and, more generally, to the
operationalization of my version of the nexus requirement, in
future work. For now, suffice it to say that the Ninth
Circuit's specific articulation of the nexus test does not
provide a satisfactory answer in this and in other difficult

enforceability of licenses conditioned on the payment of royalties:
A licensee arguably may commit copyright infringement by continuing
to use the licensed work while failing to make required royalty payments, even though a failure to make payments otherwise lacks a
nexus to the licensor's exclusive statutory rights. We view payment as
sui generis, however, because of the distinct nexus between payment
and all commercial copyright licenses, not just those concerning software.
MDY, 629 F.3d at 941 n.4. Here, the court is unclear about whether a payment
requirement has the requisite nexus to an exclusive right, or whether it is enforceable despite the lack of a nexus. Either could conceivably be true depending on what the court means by "use" for which a royalty must be paid.
98. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591-92 (1994).
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cases. But, by pointing us toward the reasoning of touch and
concern, it suggests a surprisingly promising approach.
VI. CONCLUSION
Ironically, the touch and concern doctrine may prove to
be more useful as an approach to assessing "the new
servitudes" than it has been in the land context where it
initially arose. The Ninth Circuit's opinion in MDY offers an
example of a court attempting, in the copyright servitude
context, to identify a limiting doctrine that both recognizes
the possibility of running restrictions on "ordinary" uses of
copies of protected works, and also limits those restrictions
based on the purposes the underlying property regime is
designed to serve.
Having a limiting doctrine is valuable, in part, because
the established systems for providing notice of real servitudes
So one
are not replicated in the realm of copyright."
land
(that
concern"
and
rationale for jettisoning "touch
recording systems provide a superior mechanism for making
servitudes noticeable) is absent here. But beyond concern
with notice-and thus even in cases with actual notice by the
party who would bear the burden-intellectual property law's
animating principles provide courts with a touchstone for
deciding what restrictions deserve to be enforceable via
copyright (or patent) law.
Identifying the underlying purposes of real property (and
thus the contours of touch and concern) is a difficult and
contentious endeavor. The purposes of intellectual property,
by contrast, are constitutionally defined. That is not to say
that the constitutional design "[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts" has a clearly agreed upon meaning,
or that it will be easy to apply. But it does provide a starting
point for thinking about the new servitudes-informed, but
not constrained, by the logic and lessons of the old.

99. Cf Molly S. Van Houweling, Author Autonomy and Atomism in
Copyright Law, 96 VA. L. REV. 549, 630-32 (2010) (discussing potential
mechanisms for providing notice and managing information costs in copyright).

